The IRGC at a Crossroads: Strategic Lessons from the June 2025 Israel-Iran War

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For Iran, the June 2025 Israel-Iran War was the costliest conventional conflict since the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). Throughout the Israel-Iran War and with support from Israeli commandos and Mossad operatives inside Iran, Israel launched hundreds of air attacks that killed at least nine leading nuclear scientists and six senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian military, more broadly. The attacks also claimed the lives of over 4,870 civilians and wounded and displaced thousands more. Additionally, they damaged and destroyed nuclear and military facilities and residential areas around the country. As such, the war and its aftermath reshaped the IRGC’s domestic authority and regional posture. Established during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the IRGC is a military branch and powerful organization that is responsible for protecting the regime against internal and external enemies.

Domestically, and as had been the case during the Iran-Iraq War, the Israel-Iran War increased the IRGC’s domestic authority as a martyr and defender of not just the regime, but also the nation from foreign aggression. At the same time and as in the past, the IRGC’s intensified repression of Iranians during and after the war could dilute its authority over time if it has not done so already. Regionally, the IRGC had to rethink the future of the Axis of Resistance as part of the forward defense strategy. In the process, it could pursue a policy and strategy of stronger self-sufficiency, with limited assistance from foreign allies and partners. This policy and strategy would be predicated on a robust drone and missile arsenal and potentially a weaponized nuclear program.

The IRGC’s Domestic Authority as a Martyr, Defender, and Repressor

During the Israel-Iran War, the IRGC became a martyr and defender of not just the regime, but also the nation from foreign aggression. In terms of martyrdom, which is considered a sacred and significant concept in the Islamic Republic and Shia Islam, the IRGC lost several top commanders and hundreds of lower-ranking soldiers in the war. Consequently, and four days after the conflict ended on June 28th, the regime or state held high-profile and public funerals to honor and commemorate sixty of the fallen, including the IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists.

In addition to gaining the status of a martyr, the IRGC emerged from the war as a defender of the nation. During the conflict, and despite the death and destruction of key personnel and critical infrastructure, the IRGC imposed a cost on Israel for attacking Iran and on the United States for supporting Israel. It did so by deploying at least 1,000 combat drones and 400 to 525 ballistic missiles. Out of these missiles, an estimated 36 to 60 of them struck military and civilian sites inside Israel, irrespective of its sophisticated air defense systems that were supplemented and supported by those of the United States and other countries. In the process, they killed 31 civilians and injured and displaced many more. The missiles instilled fear in the population and forced it to continuously seek shelter throughout the day and night. The true or full extent of the impact of the IRGC’s drones and missiles remain unknown due to censorship by the Israeli military.

Over the course of the conflict and alongside the rest of the Iranian military, the IRGC doubled the success rate of its missiles from 8 percent to 16 percent between the first and second weeks of the war. These rates peaked at 37 percent (10 out of 27 missiles) and 25 percent toward the end of the conflict on June 22nd and 23rd, respectively. They revealed the IRGC’s adaptability and resulted from its varying attack patterns and more advanced and longer-range missiles that overwhelmed and circumvented Israel’s air defenses systems. These rates also demonstrated the depletion of Israel’s inventory of long-range missiles that were deployed by these systems. To support these systems, the United States utilized 25 percent of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAD) missile interceptors and precipitated a stockpile shortage that prompted a pause in its military aid to Ukraine. On June 23rd, the IRGC launched a targeted and telegraphed missile strike on the largest American airbase in the region called Al-Udeid in Qatar. Designed to save face and deescalate tensions, the strike pushed Washington to impose a ceasefire on Israel and Iran immediately afterwards.

During and after the war, the IRGC became a major martyr and national defender amid a surge of Iranian nationalism and a rally around the flag effect among certain segments of society. Moreover, some of the regime’s most ardent opponents condemned Israel for attacking Iran and for doing them a disservice and one to democracy inside the country. That said, and due to the weakness of civil-military relations and the internal operations of the IRGC, it was still seen by many as a force for repression. For the IRGC and the regime, this repression further weakened their authority and legitimacy, as well as state-society relations, more generally. Even before the war and during previous decades, this repression steadily increased during successive waves or cycles of popular protests that included the following: the 1999 student movement protests (5-17 deaths and 1,000-1,500 arrests), the 2009 Green Movement or presidential election protests (36-72 deaths and approximately 4,000 arrests), the 2017-18 protests (23-25 deaths and 3,700-4,972 arrests), the 2019-20 protests (1,500 deaths and over 7,000 arrests), and the 2022-23 Woman, Life, Freedom or Mahsa Amini protests (over 551 deaths and 19,262 arrests).

In the wake of the war, this repressive trend continued with the regime detaining 21,000 citizens and executing others, particularly those from ethnic-minority provinces, on accusations of espionage and treason. Even if the IRGC was not directly implicated or involved in some of these detentions and executions, they caused it to squander some of the social capital it had accumulated from parts of the Iranian public as a martyr and defender during the war. Consequently, and combined with other oppressive measures like prolonged or extended internet blackouts, the detentions and executions could further set back state-society relations and subject the IRGC and the wider military and security establishment to increased intelligence infiltration by Israel and the United States. For the IRGC and the Iranian military and security establishment, the war exposed this infiltration and other vulnerabilities, including insufficient and deficient air defenses and inferior conventional capabilities compared with those of Israel and the United States.

The IRGC’s Regional Posture: From the Axis of Resistance to Stronger Self-Sufficiency

Following the death and destruction of the Israel-Iran War and with speculation of another conflict erupting before the end of the year, the IRGC and the Iranian military have sought to salvage or restore any semblance of deterrence and security against Israel and the United States. To this end, they have been forced to rethink the future of the Axis of Resistance as part of the forward defense doctrine. For the purposes of state security and regime survival, the doctrine’s fundamental objective is to fight Iran’s enemies, especially conventionally superior ones like Israel and the United States, outside its borders through regional proxies and other capabilities. By bringing the fight inside Iran, the doctrine failed to achieve this objective with the Israel-Iran War occurring as an extension of the Gaza war.

Since the Gaza war started on October 7th, 2023, and in what some scholars and analysts called an annus horribilis for the Islamic Republic and the IRGC, they suffered strategic setbacks in the form of degraded proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, particularly Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Intent on changing the balance of power in the region, Israel hit these organizations hard by decimating their command-and-control structures and their missile and rocket systems while killing and injuring countless civilians. The fact that these proxies and partners were compromised prompted the IRGC and the Iranian military to directly engage in military confrontation with Israel for the first time in history twice in 2024. This confrontation was provoked by Israel’s airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April that killed eight officers of the IRGC and a commander of its extraterritorial unit or branch, the Quds Force, which specializes in unconventional warfare and military intelligence. It was also provoked by Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran in July and Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in Beirut in September.

After the IRGC and the Iranian military launched drones and missiles at Israel in a measured manner in April and October, Israel struck targets that were limited in scope but located inside Iran. Meanwhile, Iran’s proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance continued to confront severe, if not existential, challenges. In December, they culminated in the swift fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime as Tehran’s only reliable Arab ally and land bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In the context of these challenges and the wake of the Israel-Iran War, the IRGC and the Iranian military and security establishment had to rethink the future of the Axis of Resistance. Since the Gaza war, two of the most prominent pillars of the Axis of Resistance no longer existed or were extremely weakened. Assuming the new Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) could create a strong and stable state, the IRGC and its Quds Force could continue to abandon Syria and any attempt to maintain influence there. After Israel’s pager attacks against Hezbollah and its assassination of Nasrallah in September 2024, serious questions and doubts surfaced about whether the organization could regroup and reconstitute itself, as it confronted renewed pressure to disarm.

With the weakening of the Axis of Resistance, the IRGC and the Iranian military and security establishment will have to decide the degree which to deploy the Quds Force and invest more resources that were already strained by sanctions in supporting Hezbollah and other quasi- or non-state actors in the region. As one possible option, they may prioritize the Houthis in Yemen. Since the Gaza war, the Houthis imposed a military and economic cost on Israel and the United States by disrupting commercial shipping in the Red Sea – the site of 15 percent of such shipping in the world. Nevertheless, it remained questionable whether the Houthis could replace Hezbollah as the primary proxy and central cog in the Axis of Resistance. Even if the Houthis could withstand military pressure from Israel and the United States, they are restricted by their religious and ideological divergence from Iran as Zaydi Shia and by their geographic remoteness from Israel relative to Lebanon with their drone and missile strikes. Furthermore, the official visit to Lebanon in mid-August by Iran suggested it would not stop supporting Hezbollah.

If the IRGC and the Iranian military could no longer depend as much on the Axis of Resistance for deterrence and security, then this reality may mean stronger self-sufficiency – a popular slogan and persistent aspiration that predated the Iranian Revolution. This self-sufficiency could come in the form of an equally, if not more, formidable drone and missile arsenal, with limited assistance from China and other foreign allies and partners. During the Israel-Iran War and as described above, the IRGC and the Iranian military relied on this arsenal to retaliate against Israel and the United States and create the conditions for a ceasefire.

In addition to this arsenal, the IRGC and the Iranian military could further strengthen self-sufficiency, deterrence, and security by weaponizing the nuclear program. They would feel justified in doing so after Israel and the United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities that were supposed to be safeguarded and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The attacks also occurred amid ongoing nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran, which, unlike Israel, is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At the same time and after Washington unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reimposed sanctions against Tehran in 2018, Iran started enriching uranium at levels that exceeded those required for civilian or peaceful purposes.

With the European or E3 signatories of the JCPOA (Britain, France, and Germany) preparing to impose UN snapback sanctions on Iran in late August that had been lifted under the agreement, the IRGC and the Iranian military may be more incentivized to weaponize the nuclear program. That said, and from the standpoint of the security dilemma, doing so would be risky in that it could provoke more military action by Israel and the United States. Currently, Iran’s ceasefire with Israel remains fragile while US President Donald Trump has threatened to attack again if Tehran rebuilt and repaired the program. As indicated above, some analysts have insisted that another Israeli and American attack is imminent.

With regional tensions still simmering and such high-stakes decisions needing to be made after the war, the Iranian regime restructured the national security establishment in early August in two ways. First, it established the Supreme Defense Council for the first time since the Iran-Iraq War. The Council was created to make critical and consequential decisions concerning Iran’s defense doctrine. It also signaled that Tehran still considered the country as being in a state of war, with the possibility of renewed conflict with Tel Aviv and Washington.

Second, and around the same time, the regime appointed Ali Larijani to replace Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the head of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which oversaw the Supreme Defense Council. The move marked a strategic shift away from Ahmadian and his predecessor, Ali Shamkhani, both of whom successively headed the SNSC since 2013 after serving as commanders in the IRGC Navy. During and after the Iran-Iraq War, Larijani was an officer in the IRGC and reached the rank of brigadier general. He previously and briefly served as the head of the SNSC during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the mid-2000s.

Compared with Ahmadian and Shamkhani, Larijani had more extensive experience outside the military and security establishment as a longtime speaker of the Iranian parliament or Majles between 2008 and 2020, among other positions in the legislative and executive branches. Considered a moderate conservative and longtime insider, Larijani possessed the proper positionality and crucial political and military credentials at a critical juncture or crossroads for Iran. At this point, it could resume nuclear negotiations with the United States or reengage with it and Israel in another conflict. Should either scenario occur, Ahmadian and Shamkhani, who had overseen the nuclear negotiations with Washington until the war, could still advise Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as members of the Expediency Discernment Council alongside Larijani.

Conclusion

As Iran’s costliest conventional conflict since the Iran-Iraq War, the Israel-Iran War reshaped the IRGC’s domestic authority and regional posture. Domestically, and after suffering substantial death and destruction during the war, the IRGC became a major martyr – a status that holds historical and religious significance in the Islamic Republic. It also emerged as a defender of not just the regime, but also the nation from foreign aggression. At the same time, the IRGC continued its role as a repressor which caused the organization to squander some of the social capital it had amassed from parts of the Iranian public during the conflict. The latter could also change the IRGC’s regional posture from one predicated on the Axis of Resistance to stronger self-sufficiency, along with deterrence and security. The IRGC could achieve this outcome by maintaining and expanding a robust drone and missile arsenal, with limited assistance from foreign allies like China. It could also strengthen self-sufficiency, deterrence, and security by weaponizing the nuclear program, though doing so could provoke renewed Israeli and American military action. Confronting a critical juncture or crossroads, the IRGC and the regime must make consequential choices which, coupled with the calculus of Israel and the United States, would put Iran on the path to peace or war.vladirina32